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Abstract
We examine the eﬀects of provision of information about seller
qualities by a third-party in a directed search model with heteroge-
neous sellers, asymmetric information, and where prices are determined
ex post. The third party separates sellers into quality-diﬀerentiated
groups and provides this information to some or all buyers. We show
that this always raises total welfare, even if it causes the informed buy-
ers not to trade with low quality sellers. However, buyers and some
sellers may be made worse oﬀ in equilibrium. We also examine the pro-
vision of information by a profit maximizing monopoly, and show that
it may have an incentive to overinvest in the creation of information
relative to the social optimum.
1 Introduction
Many markets have the characteristic that prices are negotiated subsequent
to search. This is the case in models of equilibrium unemployment such
as those surveyed in Pissarides (2000), models of monetary exchange such
as Trejos and Wright (1995) and Julien, Kennes and King (2006) and the
basic competing auction models of Wolinsky (1988) and McAfee (1993).
A fundamental problem in such markets if sellers are heterogeneous is that
search could be better directed if buyers had some notion about the qualities
of the competing sellers. Moreover, assuming that information gathering is
subject to economies of scale, it can be argued that the provision of such
information is best carried out by a monopoly third party. If a commercial
enterprise undertakes this activity, questions are raised about its incentives
to accumulate information, the methods by which this information is sold,
the consequences for income redistribution, and the eﬀects this information
has on search behavior and prices. The basic goal of this paper is to provide
some answers to these questions.
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To date, the theoretical analysis of informed versus uniformed search
invariably assumes that buyers receive price information (Salop & Stiglitz
1977, Anderson & Renault 2000 and Baye & Morgan 2001). In other words,
these models assume that sellers are committed to a nominal price and that
buyers are concerned with uncovering such commitments. Consequently, it is
not obvious whether this literature oﬀers clear insights about the incentives
to gather information in markets where prices are determined ex post.
In this paper, we seek to understand the market for information about
seller quality in an economy with search frictions and ex post pricing. To
this end, we extend the competing auction model of McAfee (1993) and
Wolinsky (1988) to include a third party information provider that does not
itself transact in the market. We allow for sellers of two quality types — good
and bad — and we consider how the third party information provider chooses
to gather, price, and distribute its information about seller qualities.
The third party in our model operates by collecting information about
sellers and distributing it to buyers. Potentially, the third party can earn
revenues both from selling the information to buyers, and from charging
good sellers to be distinguished from other sellers (to be ‘accredited’). The
third party therefore operates a ‘two-sided’ platform (Rochet & Tirole 2003,
Caillaud & Jullien 2003, and Schiﬀ 2003) and, if its objective is profit maxi-
mization, it must simultaneously consider the demands on both sides of the
market when making its pricing decisions.
We are interested in three basic issues. First, how does the provision
of information to buyers in the form of a partition of sellers into quality-
diﬀerentiated groups aﬀect the equilibrium search patterns of buyers, and
what are the subsequent eﬀects on equilibrium prices and welfare? We use
the answer to this question to examine the incentives for a social planner
to create and distribute information, and to derive the willingness to pay
of buyers to be informed and the willingness to pay of good sellers to be
accredited.
Second, if the third party is a profit-maximizing monopolist, what rev-
enues can it earn from doing so, and what are its incentives to gather in-
formation in comparison with those of a social planner? And third, if a
monopoly third party is restricted to pricing on only one side of the market
(i.e. selling ‘guidebooks’ to buyers or selling ‘accreditations’ to good sellers),
what influences its choice of which side to target?
We find that the provision of information to some or all buyers always
raises equilibrium welfare, even if it causes informed buyers not to trade with
lower quality sellers. Assuming for simplicity that the costs of creating and
distributing information are fixed, the maximum welfare level is attained
when the quality of every seller is identified and this information is given
to all buyers. We also examine the distributional eﬀects of providing such
information. We show that if not all buyers are informed then those who
are uninformed are made worse oﬀ in equilibrium relative to a situation in
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which all buyers are uninformed. In addition, the buyers who are informed
may be worse oﬀ in equilibrium relative to when all buyers are uninformed.
This occurs if the partition of sellers is not suﬃciently ‘informative’ about
seller qualities, in a sense that we will make clear in the paper. In addition,
at the social optimum, most of the welfare gains accrue to good sellers, as
buyers may be worse oﬀ and bad sellers are always worse oﬀ from being
identified as such.
We then turn to monopoly provision of information and characterize
the demands faced by the monopolist on the two sides of the market. We
show that buyers’ demand for information has normal characteristics — it is
decreasing in the price of information, and increasing in the quality of the
information provided. In contrast, we show that demand by good sellers for
accreditations is potentially increasing in the price of accreditations, within
some range of parameter values. That is, the willingness to pay of good
sellers to be accredited may increase as the number of accredited good sellers
increases. This is because an increase in the number of good sellers that are
accredited increases the diﬀerential between the quality of an accredited
seller (who we assumed can only be a good seller) and the expected quality
of an unaccredited seller (who may be a good or bad seller).
Having characterized the demands, we consider the monopolist’s choice
of prices to maximize its profits, and the resulting profit that it makes. We
find that the monopolist may have an incentive overinvest in information
compared to the social planner. That is, it may create information at cost
levels that the social planner would not. This is because the upward-sloping
demand for accreditations enables the monopolist to extract relatively large
revenues from the seller side of the market.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic
model and defines the type of information that the third party creates about
sellers. Section 3 examines the eﬀects on the model’s equilibrium of the pro-
vision of such information to some or all buyers, and characterizes a social
planner’s incentives to create and distribute information. We examine pro-
vision of information by a monopolist in section 4 and derive the demands
that it faces on both sides of the market. We then report the results of
a numerical simulation analysis in section 5, where we examine the incen-
tives of a social planner and a monopolist to create information, quantify
the equilibrium welfare eﬀects in both cases, and examine the monopolist’s
choice of business model. Section 6 gives concluding remarks.
2 The model
A search market operates for one period with M buyers and N sellers. We
assume the market is ‘large’ so that the sets of buyers and sellers can be
treated as contiuums. We normalize N = 1 and denote the overall buyer-
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seller ratio (‘market tightness’) by Φ ≡ M/N . Each seller has a single unit
of a good for sale, and each buyer wishes to purchase one unit.
We assume there are two types of seller that sell goods of diﬀerent quality
levels. Good type sellers have goods of a quality level normalized to 1 for sale,
and bad type sellers have goods of a quality level represented by θ ∈ (0, 1).
We assume that half of the sellers are of each type, and denote the overall
expected quality of a randomly chosen seller by eq ≡ 12 (1 + θ). For simplicity
we assume that all goods are worth zero to a seller.
Buyers are assumed to have identical preferences for quality. A good
with quality x ∈ {θ, 1} gives gross utility x to any buyer. In the basic
version of the model, buyers do not know the quality that any given seller
has for sale but do know the distribution of qualities among sellers, that is,
there is asymmetric information.
Sellers are assumed to sell their goods by advertising competing auctions.
Buyers must simultaneously and independently choose to visit the auction
of only one seller. Since each seller has only a single unit of the good for
sale, there are coordination frictions among buyers. Once buyers have made
their search investment and arrive at a seller’s auction, we assume that the
buyers at the auction become perfectly informed about the seller’s quality.
Eﬀectively, we assume Bertrand competition among buyers at any given
seller’s auction. Thus a seller receives a strictly positive price if and only if
more than one buyer turns up to his or her auction.
A third party that collects information (at some cost) about seller types
may operate in the market. In the general case, the third-party’s technology
allows it to divide the sellers into two quality-diﬀerentiated groups, which
we call submarkets. A submarket is a group of sellers that appear identical
from a buyer’s point of view when buyers are choosing which seller to visit.
The third party is able to inform buyers of the proportion of sellers and the
expected quality of a randomly chosen seller in each submarket. We call
the two submarkets the high quality submarket and low quality submarket
and let qh and ql respectively denote the expected quality levels, where
θ ≤ ql < eq < qh ≤ 1. We also let α denote the proportion of sellers in the
low quality submarket. Note that αql + (1− α) qh ≡ eq. We use φl and φh
to denote the market tightnesses in the two submarkets.
Definition 1 An information partition is a pair (α, ql) where α ∈
¡
0, 12 (1− θ) / (1− ql)
¢
is the proportion of sellers in the submarket with expected quality ql ∈ [θ, eq).
We use the idea of an information partition as defined above to represent
the information created by the third party. We assume that the third party
creates an information partition and informs some or all of the buyers of the
values of α and ql. Figure 1 shows the set of feasible information partitions
that can be created. Note that no information is created if either α = 0
or ql = 12 (1 + θ). In some later sections we restrict attention to the upper
frontier of this feasible set.
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Figure 1: Feasible information partitions.
Given an information partition we can find qh as
qh (α, ql) =
eq − αql
1− α (1)
and φh as
φh (α, φl) =
Φ− αφl
1− α . (2)
3 Equilibrium search patterns and welfare eﬀects
In this section we examine how the equilibrium search patterns of buyers
are aﬀected by the provision of an information partition to some or all of
the buyers, and the consequent welfare eﬀects. For now we will work in
the general case, without imposing further restrictions on the set of feasible
information partitions, and without being specific about the precise way
in which the information is created or distributed. In particular, we wish
to examine the eﬀects of providing a general information partition (α, ql)
to some fraction 0 < β ≤ 1 of buyers. In subsequent sections we will
examine and compare some particular ways of creating information about
seller qualities and of distributing this information to buyers.
3.1 Benchmark: All buyers are uninformed
As a benchmark, we first briefly review the equilibrium outcomes when all
buyers have no information about seller qualities. For more details, see
Kennes (2004).
We concentrate on a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where buyers
randomize over the locations of sellers. In such an equilibrium, it is possible
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to show that the probability that any given seller receives at least one buyer
is 1− e−Φ and hence total welfare when all buyers are uninformed is
W0 =
¡
1− e−Φ
¢ eq. (3)
The welfare losses due to search frictions are e−Φeq.
It is also possible to show that the equilibrium probability that a buyer
is alone at a seller is e−Φ. Under our assumption of Bertrand competition,
buyers only receive a strictly positive payoﬀ if alone at a seller, hence the
total welfare of buyers is B0 = Φe−Φeq. In a market with tightness φ, the
equilibrium probability that any given seller receives more than one buyer
and hence receives a strictly positive payoﬀ is p (φ) = 1−(1 + φ) e−φ. Hence
the aggregate welfares of bad and good sellers are X0 = 12p (Φ) θ and Y0 =
1
2p (Φ) respectively. Note that p
0 (φ) > 0.
3.2 Equilibrium search patterns with informed buyers
We now consider the case where a fraction β of buyers are informed of an
information partition (α, ql) and the remaining fraction 1− β of buyers are
uninformed about seller qualities. Our goal here is to examine how this
aﬀects the equilibrium search patterns of buyers. In the next subsection we
will examine the welfare eﬀects of the provision of information relative to
the benchmark discussed above where all buyers are uninformed.
There are two possible equilibrium search patterns of the informed buy-
ers:
1. Informed buyers only randomize over sellers in the high quality sub-
market.
2. Informed buyers randomize over sellers in both submarkets.
An equilibrium of the first type occurs if what we call the exclusion
constraint (EC), to be defined below, is satisfied. In this case we have
φl = (1− β)Φ and so the exclusion constraint is given by
e−φh(α,(1−β)Φ)qh (α, ql) ≥ e−(1−β)Φql,
or,
β ≤ 1− α
Φ
ln
µ
qh (α, ql)
ql
¶
. (EC)
If an equilibrium of the second type occurs, informed buyers must have
the same expected utility from visiting a seller in either submarket, that is,
e−φhqh = e−φlql. Using this and (2) we can solve for φl and φh. In summary,
the equilibrium search patterns of buyers when β of them are informed of
6
an information partition (α, ql) give rise to the following equilibrium market
tightnesses:
φl =
½
(1− β)Φ if EC
Φ− (1− α) ln (qh (α, ql) /ql) otherwise
(4)
and
φh =
( ³
1 + αβ1−α
´
Φ if EC
Φ+ α ln (qh (α, ql) /ql) otherwise
. (5)
It is straightforward to verify that φl and φh have the following properties
for any feasible information partition:
1. If β > 0 then φh > φl.
1
2. ∂φh∂β ≥ 0 and
∂φl
∂β ≤ 0.
3. φl < Φ < φh.
4. Both φl and φh are continuous in β.
Thus, market tightness is always greater in the high quality submarket
than the low quality submarket if some buyers are informed, and this dif-
ference is weakly increasing when the fraction of informed buyers increases.
As would be expected, in equilibrium the informed buyers respond to the
creation of information by increasing the probability with which they visit
sellers in the high quality submarket.
3.3 Welfare eﬀects of the provision of information
We now consider the welfare eﬀects of providing a generic feasible informa-
tion partition (α, ql) to a fraction β of buyers. For the moment we ignore
any costs of creating the information partition, to emphasize the eﬀects on
equilibrium welfare of changes in buyer search patterns in response to the
provision of information.
3.3.1 Eﬀects on total welfare
Equilibrium total welfare when some buyers are informed is given by
W1 = α
³
1− e−φl
´
ql + (1− α)
³
1− e−φh
´
qh (α, ql) .
From (4) and (5) we have
W1 =
( eq − e−Φ hαeβΦql + (1− α) e− α1−αβΦqh (α, ql)i if ECeq − e−Φqαl qh (α, ql)1−α otherwise . (6)
1 If (EC) holds then φh − φl = βΦ/ (1− α) > 0. If (EC) does not hold then φh − φl =
ln (qh (α, ql) /ql) > 0 since qh (α, ql) > ql for a feasible information partition.
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Thus, if (EC) does not hold, welfare losses due to search frictions are propor-
tional to a Cobb-Douglas function of the information partition: qαl qh (α, ql)
1−α.
If (EC) holds there is a reduced volume of trade in the low quality submarket
since such sellers are excluded by informed buyers, but increased volume of
trade in the high quality submarket. The following proposition shows that
in both cases equilibrium total welfare increases relative to when all buyers
are uninformed.
Proposition 1 For any feasible information partition (α, ql), W1 > W0 for
all β > 0. In addition, W1 −W0 is non-decreasing in β.
Proof. When β = 0, W1 = W0. At small enough values of β, (EC) holds
and
∂W1
∂β
= −e−Φ
∙
ΦαeβΦql − (1− α)
α
1− αΦe
− αβ
1−αΦqh (α, ql)
¸
= αΦe−Φ
³
e−
αβ
1−αΦqh (α, ql)− eβΦql
´
where the term in brackets is positive exactly when (EC) holds. Thus when
(EC) holds we have W1 > W0 and W1 − W0 strictly increasing in β. If
(EC) does not hold then ∂W1/∂β = 0 and hence W1 −W0 is constant in β.
However, since φl and φh are continuous in β, so is W1, and thus we have
W1 > W0 also when (EC) does not hold.
Proposition 1 has two consequences. First, provision of an information
partition to at least some buyers always raises equilibrium total welfare.
This is because buyer search is directed more accurately, and is true even
in the case that informed buyers exclude low quality sellers, and even if this
means that all buyers exclude low quality sellers (if all buyers are informed).
Second, for any given information partition, total welfare will be maximized
if it is available to all buyers. Note however that this is not necessarily
the unique welfare maximizing solution, since if (EC) does not hold then
equilibrium welfare is constant in β. Thus if (EC) does not hold when β = 1
then β = 1− ε will also give a maximum of total welfare for small ε.
The next proposition shows that the welfare gain created by the provi-
sion of an information partition to at least some buyers is increasing in the
‘informativeness’ of the partition.
Proposition 2 When β > 0, W1−W0 is decreasing in ql and increasing in
α for any feasible information partition.
Proof. Since W0 is constant and W1 > W0, we need to check the signs of
∂W1/∂ql and ∂W1/∂α. From (6) we have
∂W1
∂ql
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
αe−Φ
³
e−
α
1−αβΦ − eβΦ
´
if EC
αe−Φ
³
ql−qh(α,ql)
ql
´³
ql
qh(α,ql)
´α
otherwise
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since ∂qh (α, ql) /∂ql = −α/ (1− α). If (EC) holds this is negative if eβΦ >
e−
α
1−αβΦ which is true since α < 1. If (EC) does not hold it is also negative,
since ql < qh (α, ql).
To sign ∂W1/∂α, define Z as such that W1 = eq − e−ΦZ, that is,
Z =
(
αeβΦql + (1− α) e−
α
1−αβΦqh (α, ql) if EC
qαl qh (α, ql)
1−α otherwise
.
If (EC) holds then
∂Z
∂α
= eβΦql − e−
α
1−αβΦqh (α, ql) +
e−
α
1−αβΦ
1− α (eq − ql − βΦqh (α, ql))
since ∂qh (α, ql) /∂α = (eq − ql) / (1− α)2. Substituting for eq = αql+(1− α) qh
and rearranging, we obtain:
∂Z
∂α
=
³
eβΦ − e−
α
1−αβΦ
´
ql −
e−
α
1−αβΦ
1− α βΦqh (α, ql) .
This is negative, and hence ∂W1/∂α is positive, if
e−
α
1−αβΦ
1− α βΦqh (α, ql) ≥
³
eβΦ − e−
α
1−αβΦ
´
ql
or,
qh (α, ql)
ql
≥ 1− α
βΦ
³
e
βΦ
1−α − 1
´
. (7)
Rearranging (EC) we obtain qh (α, ql) /ql ≥ e
βΦ
1−α . Thus (7) is implied by
(EC) if
e
βΦ
1−α ≥ 1− α
βΦ
³
e
βΦ
1−α − 1
´
.
This is true since ex ≥ (ex − 1) /x for all x > 0.
If (EC) does not hold then ln (Z) = α ln ql+(1− α) ln qh (α, ql) and hence
∂ ln (Z)
∂α
= ln ql − ln qh (α, ql) + (1− α)
∂qh (α, ql) /∂α
qh (α, ql)
= ln
µ
ql
qh (α, ql)
¶
+ 1− ql
qh (α, ql)
since ∂qh (α, ql) /∂α = (eq − ql) / (1− α)2. Thus ∂ ln (Z) /∂α is negative be-
cause lnx+ 1 ≤ x for all x, and so we have ∂W1/∂α ≥ 0.
A straightforward consequence of propositions 1 and 2 is the following:
Proposition 3 Welfare is maximized when a perfect information partition,¡
1
2 , θ
¢
, is given to all buyers.
9
0.
01
0.
06
0.
11
0.
16
0.
21
0.
26
0.
31
0.
36
0.
41
0.
46
0.
51
0.
56
0.
61
0.
66
0.
71
0.
76
0.
81
0.
86
0.
91
0.
96
0.
1
0.
5
0.
9
1.
3
1.
7
2.
1
2.
5
2.
9
3.
3
3.
7
4.
1
4.
5
4.
9
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Theta
Phi
Figure 2: Maximum possible welfare gain from the provision of third-party
quality information. Note the orientation of the axes.
Therefore, letting W ∗1 denote the welfare level associated with a perfect
information partition, from (3), (6) and (EC), the maximum amount of
additional welfare that the provision of third-party quality information can
generate is given by
W ∗1 −W0 =
(
e−Φ
£eq − 12 ¡eΦθ + e−Φ¢¤ if Φ ≤ 12 ln ¡1θ¢
e−Φ
heq −√θi otherwise .
This is shown graphically in Figure 2. From this we can conclude that the
provision of third-party quality information is more useful in markets where
there is a bigger relative diﬀerence between bad and good quality, and/or
the market is relatively ‘thin’ (relatively few buyers to sellers).
3.3.2 Welfare eﬀects on buyers
Let us now consider the eﬀects on the equilibrium welfare of buyers from
the provision of third party quality information. Suppose that a fraction β
of buyers are informed. The expected payoﬀ of an uninformed buyer is
bU = αe
−φlql + (1− α) e−φhqh (α, ql) .
Thus from (4) and (5) we have
bU =
(
e−Φ
h
αeβΦql + (1− α) e−
α
1−αβΦqh (α, ql)
i
if EC
e−Φqαl qh (α, ql)
1−α otherwise
. (8)
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Proposition 4 Uninformed buyers are always worse oﬀ when some buyers
are informed compared to when no buyers are informed.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that bU is continuous in β. It is also
simple to check that given an information partition (α, ql), if β = 0 then
bU = b0 where b0 = B0/Φ is the payoﬀ of an individual buyer when no
buyers are informed. For small values of β, (EC) holds, and
∂bU
∂β
= Φαe−Φ
h
eβΦql − e−
α
1−αβΦqh (α, ql)
i
.
The term in square brackets is negative exactly when (EC) holds. For large
values of β, (EC) does not hold and bU − b0 is constant in β. From the
continuity of bU we thus have bU < b0 for all β > 0.
In equilibrium, informed buyers either only visit sellers in the high qual-
ity submarket, or randomize over all sellers such that their expected payoﬀ
from visiting a seller in either submarket is the same. Therefore, the ex-
pected payoﬀ of an informed buyer is
bI = e
−φhqh (α, ql) .
Thus from (5) we have
bI =
(
e−Φe−
α
1−αβΦqh (α, ql) if EC
e−Φqαl qh (α, ql)
1−α otherwise
. (9)
Proposition 5 If (EC) does not hold, informed buyers are worse oﬀ relative
to when all buyers are uninformed.
Proof. If (EC), bI = bU , and from proposition 4 we have bU < b0.
If (EC) holds, informed buyers may be better or worse oﬀ relative to
when all buyers are uninformed. In this case, the change in an informed
buyer’s payoﬀ is
bI − b0 = e−Φ
h
e−
α
1−αβΦqh (α, ql)− eqi .
Comparing with (EC), we can see that informed buyers may be better or
worse oﬀ.
From the above results we can conclude that buyers in aggregate will
be worse oﬀ from the provision of an information partition to some or all
buyers if it is not suﬃciently informative as to allow the informed buyers
to exclude bad sellers. Given this, it is important to show that informed
buyers will actually use information provided to them when making their
search decisions. The following proposition shows that if an information
partition is given to some buyers, it will be an equilibrium for all of them
to actually use it.
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Proposition 6 If an information partition (α, ql) is provided to a fraction
β of buyers then none of them can gain by unilaterally not using this infor-
mation.
Proof. If (EC) does not hold, from (8) and (9) we have bI = bU buyers are
indiﬀerent about using the information. If (EC) holds, we have
bI − bU = αe−Φ
h
e−
α
1−αβΦqh (α, ql)− eβΦql
i
and the term in square brackets is positive exactly when (EC) holds. Thus
we have bI ≥ bU always.
The proof of proposition 6 also gives the condition under which informed
buyers will be better oﬀ in equilibrium than uninformed buyers, and hence
will be willing to pay for information.
Corollary 1 Buyers are only willing to pay for an information partition if
it enables them to exclude sellers in the low quality submarket in equilibrium,
that is, if (EC) holds.
We can also confirm that if an information partition is available to some
or all buyers, there will not be an equilibrium in which all buyers choose to
ignore the available information.
Proposition 7 If an information partition (α, ql) exists and is available to
a fraction β of buyers but is not used by any buyers then every individual
buyer has an incentive to use it.
Proof. Examining (EC) reveals that it always holds when β = 0, since the
right-hand side of the constraint is always strictly greater than zero when
the information partition is informative (i.e. when qh > ql). From the proof
of proposition 6, this means that bI > bU when β = 0, and all buyers to
whom the information is available could gain by using the information, given
that the other buyers do not.
3.3.3 Welfare eﬀects on sellers
The welfare eﬀects on sellers of the provision of an information partition to
some or all buyers are straightforward. Recall that a seller’s expected payoﬀ
in a (sub)market with tightness φ is p (φ) q where p (φ) is increasing in φ
and q is the seller’s quality. Clearly, bad sellers are made worse oﬀ and good
sellers are made better oﬀ from the provision of information to buyers, since
in equilibrium we have φl < Φ < φh.
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3.3.4 Conclusions from the welfare analysis
Let us briefly summarize our findings from the welfare analysis. First, pro-
viding an information partition to some or all buyers always raises welfare,
even if it induces the informed buyers not to trade with sellers in the low
quality submarket. The welfare gain from providing information increases
when there is greater separation between the groups of sellers, that is, when
ql decreases or α increases. In addition, the welfare gain may increase, and
does not decrease, when the partition is provided to more buyers. The so-
cially optimal solution is therefore to create a perfect information partition,¡
1
2 , θ
¢
and give it to all buyers. This maximizes total welfare even if it causes
all buyers to exclude bad sellers.
Second, uninformed buyers are always made worse oﬀ from the provision
of information to some other buyers, while the informed buyers may be
worse oﬀ if the information partition is not suﬃciently informative so as to
allow them to excluded sellers in the low quality submarket. Buyers are
only willing to pay for an information partition if it allows them to exclude
sellers in the low quality submarket.
Third, bad sellers are made worse oﬀ and good sellers are made better
oﬀ. Combining the above results, it appears that, in aggregate, most of
the welfare gains are likely to accrue to good sellers. We will examine the
distribution of welfare numerically in section 5 below.
4 Monopoly information provision
The preceding analysis examined the provision of information to buyers
without saying how it was generated or how it was distributed to buyers. In
this section we consider information provision by a monopolist, who has ac-
cess to some technology for generating information and a way of distributing
it to buyers.
Rather than considering a general information partition as above, in this
section we simplify and assume that the monopolist creates information by
‘accrediting’ a fraction σ of good sellers. The information partition created
is thus:
(α (σ) , ql (σ)) =
µ
1− 1
2
σ,
1− σ + θ
2− σ
¶
. (10)
In terms of the set of feasible information partitions as shown in Figure
1, we are restricting attention to the upper frontier of this set, with σ de-
termining the position along the frontier between full information (σ = 1)
and no information (σ = 0). Note also that this implies qh = 1, since only
good sellers can be accredited by assumption. Under these restrictions, the
exclusion constraint becomes e−φh ≥ e−φlql (σ), or
β ≤ −σ
2Φ
ln ql (σ) . (EC*)
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We assume that the monopolist has two potential sources of revenue: it
can sell the information partition that it creates to buyers, and it can charge
good sellers to be accredited. We let pG denote the price that a buyer must
pay to obtain the information partition, and pA denote the price that a good
seller must pay to be accredited.
We can define the buyer-seller ratios φl (β, σ) and φh (β, σ) by substitut-
ing (10) into (4) and (5) respectively to give
φl (β, σ) =
½
(1− β)Φ if EC*
Φ+ 12σ ln ql (σ) otherwise
(11)
and
φh (β, σ) =
½ ¡
1 + 2−σσ β
¢
Φ if EC*
Φ−
¡
1− 12σ
¢
ln ql (σ) otherwise
. (12)
4.1 Demand for information
The first step in analyzing the monopolist’s behavior is to derive the de-
mands on the two sides of the market. We let pG (β, σ) denote the willing-
ness of buyers to pay for information and pA (β, σ) denote the willingness of
good sellers to pay to be accredited.
4.1.1 Demand by buyers
A buyer gets bI − pG from buying the information and bU from being in-
formed, where bU and bI are given by (8) and (9) above. Since all buyers are
identical we look for a mixed strategy equilibrium in which buyers random-
ize over being informed, that is, where bI − pG = bU . From corollary 1 we
know that buyers will only be willing to pay a positive price if the informed
buyers are able to exclude unaccredited sellers. We therefore have buyers’
willingness to pay for an information partition given by
pG (β, σ) =
½
α (σ)
£
e−φh(β,σ) − e−φl(β,σ)ql (σ)
¤
if EC*
0 otherwise
. (13)
Proposition 8 Buyers’ demand for information has the following proper-
ties:
1. Continuous in β for all β ∈ [0, 1].
2. There is always some demand: pG (0, σ) > 0 for σ > 0.
3. Willingness to pay is non-decreasing in the fraction of accredited good
sellers: ∂pG∂σ ≥ 0.
4. Demand slopes down: ∂pG∂β ≤ 0.
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Proof.
1. Follows from the continuity of φh and φl in β.
2. Follows from the proof of proposition 7.
3. Changes in σ aﬀect both the number of sellers in the two submarkets
and the relative quality between them. If (EC*) holds, using the fact
that ∂φl(β,σ)∂σ = 0, we have
∂pG (β, σ)
∂σ
= e−φh(β,σ)
∙
α0 (σ)− α (σ) ∂φh (β, σ)
∂σ
¸
−e−φl(β,σ)
£
α0 (σ) ql (σ) + α (σ) q0l (σ)
¤
Substituting and rearranging gives
∂pG (β, σ)
∂σ
=
1
2
³
e−φl − e−φh
´
+
β (2− σ)Φ
σ
e−φh
which is positive since φh > φl implies e
−φl > e−φh .
4. If (EC*) holds,
∂pG (β, σ)
∂β
= α (σ)
∙
∂φl (β, σ)
∂β
e−φl(β,σ)ql (σ)−
∂φh (β, σ)
∂β
e−φh(β,σ)
¸
= −α (σ)Φ
∙
e−φl(β,σ)ql (σ) +
2− σ
σ
e−φh(β,σ)
¸
< 0 (14)
The willingness to pay of buyers thus exhibits standard properties that
we would expect from a demand curve. Willingness to pay is positive at
β = 0 and declines as β increases. At some point, (EC*) ceases to hold, and
buyers’ willingness to pay is zero. Willingness to pay is also increasing in
the ‘quality’ of the information that the buyer purchases, as represented by
σ.
4.1.2 Demand by good sellers
A good seller gets p (φh) − pA from being accredited and p (φl) from being
unaccredited. Since φh > φl, good sellers are always willing to pay something
to be accredited, provided that at least some buyers are informed (β > 0).
Since all good sellers are identical we look for a mixed strategy equilibrium
where good sellers randomize over being accredited or not. The demand for
accreditations is therefore given by
pA (β, σ) = p (φh (β, σ))− p (φl (β, σ)) . (15)
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Proposition 9 Good sellers’ demand for accreditations has the following
properties:
1. Continuous in σ for all σ ∈ [0, 1].
2. There is always some demand: pA (β, 0) > 0 for β > 0.
3. Willingness to pay is non-decreasing in the number of informed buyers:
∂pA
∂β ≥ 0.
4. Demand slopes down (∂pA∂σ < 0) when (EC*) holds and slopes up
(∂pA∂σ > 0) when (EC*) does not hold.
Proof.
1. Follows from the continuity of φh and φl and p (·).
2. Follows from the fact that φh > φl when β > 0, and the fact that p (·)
is a strictly increasing function.
3. Follows from the fact that ∂φh∂β ≥ 0 and
∂φl
∂β ≤ 0, and that p (·) is a
strictly increasing function.
4. If (EC*) holds then φl (β, σ) is constant in σ and
∂φh(β,σ)
∂σ = −2Φβ/σ2 <
0. Since p (·) is a strictly increasing function, p (φh) − p (φl) declines
when σ increases. If (EC*) does not hold then
∂φl (β, σ)
∂σ
=
1
2
µ
ln ql (σ) +
σ (θ − 1)
(2− σ) (1 + θ − σ)
¶
and
∂φh (β, σ)
∂σ
=
1
2
ln ql (σ) +
1− θ
2 (1 + θ − σ) .
The former is unambiguously negative. The latter may be positive or
negative. However, note that (EC*) holds for relatively high values of
σ and does not hold for σ = 0. Furthermore,
∂φh (β, 0)
∂σ
=
1
2
ln
1 + θ
2
+
1− θ
2 (1 + θ)
> 0
and
∂2φh (β, σ)
∂σ2
=
(1− θ)2
2 (2− σ) (1 + θ − σ)2
> 0.
Thus φh (β, σ) is strictly increasing in σ when (EC*) does not hold.
Therefore, when (EC*) does not hold φl (β, σ) is strictly decreasing
in σ and φh (β, σ) is strictly increasing in σ. Since p (·) is a strictly
increasing function, pA (β, σ) is strictly increasing in σ.
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The properties of the willingness of good sellers to pay for being accred-
ited are all as would be expected, except for the fact that demand is upward
sloping when (EC*) does not hold. To see why this is the case, note that
when σ increases, two things happen. One, ql decreases, i.e. the expected
quality of unaccredited sellers relative to that of accredited sellers decreases
(quality eﬀect). This causes buyers to search more intensively in the good
submarket and raises the probability of trade for sellers in that submarket.
Two, the number of sellers decreases in the bad submarket and increases
in the good submarket (quantity eﬀect). The first eﬀect increases the gains
from being accredited, but the second eﬀect decreases them. Which eﬀect
dominates depends on whether or not (EC*) holds.
When (EC*) does not hold (at low values of σ), an increase in σ decreases
ql relative to qh and the equilibrium search pattern of buyers changes so that
φl decreases and φh increases. Thus p (φh)−p (φl) increases, and good sellers
are willing to pay more to be accredited. In other words, the gain to a good
seller from being accredited increases with the number of good sellers who
are accredited, provided that unaccredited sellers are not excluded.
When (EC*) holds, unaccredited sellers are excluded and φl = 0. In this
case an increase in σ only serves to increase the number of sellers in the
good submarket, and φh falls. Thus demand for accreditations is decreasing
in σ when (EC*) holds.
4.2 Monopoly profit
Assuming for now no costs of creating information, since the total number
of buyers is Φ and the total number of good sellers is 12 , the monopolist’s
profit is:
π (β, σ) = ΦpG (β, σ)β + 12pA (β, σ)σ.
The monopolist chooses β and σ simultaneously to maximize its profit.
Proposition 10 Monopoly profit is maximized by accrediting all good sell-
ers and making this information available to all buyers, that is, where σ =
β = 1.
Proof. The first-order conditions are:
∂π (β, σ)
∂β
= ΦpG (β, σ) +Φ
∂pG (β, σ)
∂β
+
1
2
σ
∂pA (β, σ)
∂β
= 0 (16)
∂π (β, σ)
∂σ
= Φβ
∂pG (β, σ)
∂σ
+
1
2
pA (β, σ) +
1
2
σ
∂pA (β, σ)
∂σ
= 0 (17)
Examining (17), we see that if (EC*) does not hold then ∂π(β,σ)∂σ > 0 since
from proposition 8 we have ∂pG(β,σ)∂σ = 0 and from proposition 9 we have
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∂pA(β,σ)
∂σ > 0. If (EC*) does hold then using (11), (12), (13) and (15) after
some manipulation we obtain
∂π (β, σ)
∂σ
=
(1 + Φ)
¡
σe−φl(β,σ) + (2βΦ− σ) e−φh(β,σ)
¢
2σ
.
This is positive if
β >
σ
¡
e−φh(β,σ) − e−φl(β,σ)
¢
2Φe−φh
which is always true since the right-hand side is negative due to the fact
that φh (β, σ) > φl (β, σ) and e
−x is a strictly decreasing function. Thus the
monopolist will always set σ = 1.
It remains to show that β = 1 is profit maximizing given that σ = 1.
First suppose that β is small so that (EC*) holds. Then from (11), (12),
(13), (14) and (15) we have
∂π (β, 1)
∂β
=
1
2
Φ
h
e−φh(β,1) − e−φl(β,1)θ
i
−1
2
Φ2
h
e−φl(β,1)θ + e−φh(β,1)
i
+
1
2
Φ2
h
(1 + β) e−φh(β,1) + (1− β) e−φl(β,1)
i
which simplifies to
∂π (β, 1)
∂β
=
1
2
Φe−φh(β,1) (1 + βΦ)− 1
2
Φe−φl(β,1) (θ +Φθ −Φ (1− β))
This is positive if
e−φh(β,1)
e−φl(β,1)
≥ θ +Φθ − Φ (1− β)
1 + βΦ
. (18)
If (EC*) holds and σ = 1 then we know that e−φh(β,1)/e−φl(β,1) ≥ θ. Sub-
tracting the right-hand side of (18) from θ we obtain
θ − θ +Φθ − Φ (1− β)
1 + βΦ
=
(1− β) (1− θ)Φ
1 + βΦ
> 0
thus if (EC*) holds then (18) also holds. Therefore, ∂π(β,1)∂β ≥ 0 when (EC*)
holds. If (EC*) does not hold then
∂π (β, 1)
∂β
=
1
2
∂pA (β, 1)
∂β
≥ 0
from proposition 9. Thus the monopolist’s profit is maximized where β =
σ = 1.
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5 Numerical simulation results
In this section we present the results obtained from a numerical simulation
of our model. The parameters of the model are the buyer-seller ratio, Φ > 0,
and the bad quality level relative to good quality, θ ∈ (0, 1). This numeri-
cal analysis addresses three issues. First, we quantify the welfare gains and
distributional eﬀects under provision of information by a social planner and
a monopolist. Second, we examine the incentives of a social planner and a
monopolist to create information when doing so requires incurring a fixed
cost F ≥ 0. Third, if we further restrict the monopolist to only serving one
‘side’ of the market, that is, to only sell guidebooks or only sell accredita-
tions, we examine the factors that influence the monopolist’s choice of which
side to serve.
5.1 Welfare eﬀects
Figure 2 showed the maximum possible welfare gain, which occurs when a
perfect information partition,
¡
1
2 , θ
¢
is given to all buyers, as a function of
the parameters Φ and θ. In this section we present numerical results that
quantify how this welfare gain is distributed among the economic agents in
the model under the planner and monopoly solutions.2
First, figure 3 shows the welfare eﬀects on buyers (in aggregate) under
the planner and the monopolist. The upper two graphs show the percentage
change in aggregate welfare of buyers relative to their equilibrium welfare
level when search is ‘unguided’, that is, relative to the benchmark charac-
terized in section 3.1 where no buyers are informed. The lower two graphs
show the change in aggregate welfare of buyers divided by the change in the
level of total welfare due to the provision of information.
From figure 3 we can see that buyers are always worse oﬀ under monopoly
and worse oﬀ in many cases under the social planner. Buyers are only better
oﬀ under the planner if the bad quality level is relatively low, or if the buyer-
seller ratio is relatively low. For some parameter cases shown, the eﬀects
on buyers are identical under the social planner and monopoly. This occurs
if the parameters are such that in equilibrium buyers do not exclude bad
sellers. In that case, as shown in corollary 1, buyers do not benefit from
being informed and the monopolist is unable to extract any revenue from
them, and proposition 5 tells us that buyers are made worse oﬀ by the
provision of information.
Figure 4 shows the welfare eﬀects on the bad sellers of the provision
of information by both the planner and monopolist. Since the monopolist
does not generate any revenue directly from the bad sellers, the eﬀects on
bad sellers are identical in both cases. We can also see that the welfare
2Recall from propositions 3 and 10, both of these solutions involve creating a perfect
information partition and making it available to all buyers.
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Figure 3: Welfare eﬀects on buyers.
loss suﬀered by bad sellers can be as high as 100% of their welfare under
unguided search if bad sellers are excluded by buyers in equilibrium, since
both the planner and monopolist provide a perfect information partition to
all buyers.
Figure 5 shows the aggregate welfare eﬀects on the good sellers. Under
the planner, good sellers are always better oﬀ from the provision of infor-
mation because identifying the good sellers results in an increase in their
probability of trade. The numerical results also show that under the plan-
ner the gains to good sellers can be many times the total welfare gain. Thus
the good sellers benefit from the welfare losses suﬀered by bad sellers and
by buyers.
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Figure 4: Welfare eﬀects on bad sellers.
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Figure 5: Welfare eﬀects on good sellers.
Under monopoly, good sellers are always worse oﬀ relative to when buyers
are uninformed. In our model, the monopolist is able to extract from good
sellers all of the benefits of being distinguished from bad sellers. If the
parameters are such that bad sellers are excluded by buyers in equilibrium,
the monopolist is able to extract all of the surplus from a good seller. This
is because in that case a good seller’s alternative of not being accredited
means being unable to trade in equilibrium.
Finally, figure 6 shows the monopolist’s profit as a fraction of the total
welfare gain in equilibrium relative to unguided search. The numerical re-
sults indicate that in equilibrium the monopolist in many cases appropriates
more welfare than the additional welfare that it creates by the provision of
information. This occurs partly because of the upward-sloping nature of de-
mand for accreditations by good sellers when bad sellers are not excluded.
In this case, the demand for accreditations exhibits a ‘network eﬀect’ in
the sense that as more good sellers become accredited, the gain from being
accredited also increases.
5.2 Incentives to create information
The numerical version of the model can also be used to examine the incen-
tives of the social planner or monopolist to gather and distribute information
when doing so is costly. For simplicity, we assume that generating a perfect
information partition
¡
1
2 , θ
¢
and distributing it to all buyers requires either
the planner or the monopolist to incur a fixed cost of F ≥ 0. For a given
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Figure 6: Monopolist’s profit as a fraction of the total welfare gain from
providing information.
value of F , the planner will choose to create the information if the additional
welfare generated, W1 −W0, exceeds the fixed cost, while the monopolist
will choose to create the information if its total revenues from buyers and
good sellers exceed the fixed costs.
As was shown in figure 6, the monopolist is in many cases able to appro-
priate more welfare than the additional welfare that it creates due partly to
the nature of demand for accreditations. Thus for any given cost of creating
information, the monopolist has a stronger incentive to do so than the so-
cial planner. Even though the monopolist’s profit maximizing behavior is to
create a perfect information partition and distribute this to all buyers, the
nature of the demands for its services mean that it will generally choose to
overinvest in the production of information relative to the social planner.
To illustrate, figure 7 shows the parameter regions in which the planner
and/or monopolist would choose to create information for F = 0.0001, for
θ ∈ (0, 1) and Φ ∈ (0, 10). In general, the gains from creating information
decrease as the bad quality level increases or the buyer-seller ratio increases.
However, the monopolist creates information for a large region of parameters
in which it is socially undesirable to do so.
5.3 Monopolist’s choice of business model
In the previous analysis of monopoly provision of information we have as-
sumed that the monopolist serves both sides of the market, that is, earns
revenues both from accrediting good sellers and from selling information to
buyers. In this section we restrict the monopolist to only serving one side of
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Figure 7: Parameter regions in which the social planner and/or monopolist
choose to create information, for F = 0.0001. In the black region, both
the planner and the monopolist choose to create information. In the grey
region, only the monopolist chooses to create information.
the market. We consider a monopolist who either operates an accreditations
service by selling accreditations to good sellers and giving this information
to all buyers, or who operates a ‘guidebook’ service by accrediting all good
sellers and selling this information to buyers.
In particular, under a guidebook service we assume that σ = 1 and the
monopolist does not charge sellers to be accredited. Thus the monopolist’s
profit in this case is
πG (β) = ΦβpG (β, 1) .
Under an accreditations service we assume β = 1 and the monopolist does
not charge buyers for guidebooks. Thus the monopolist’s profit in this case
is
πA (σ) = 12σpA (1, σ) .
Clearly, unlike the case where the monopolist serves both sides of the market,
it cannot always be optimal to give guidebooks to all buyers, for example.
If the monopolist did that, in many cases it would earn no revenue, as
β = 1 often does not satisfy the exclusion constraint. A similar argument
applies for the sale of accreditations, since at some level of σ the demand
for accreditations becomes downward sloping. Therefore, in general the
monopoly solutions in these two more restricted cases will involve β, σ < 1.
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Figure 8: Parameter regions in which a monopolist chooses to sell guidebooks
to buyers (the grey region) or sell accredications to good sellers (the black
region).
It is not possible to obtain explicit solutions for the profit-maximizing
choice of β or σ in either case due to the nature of the functional forms
involved. Instead, we have used a numerical algorithm to find the profit-
maximizing quantity given the parameters Φ and θ. We can then evaluate
the monopolist’s profit at the optimum and compare between the two busi-
ness models.
Our objective here is not to examine why a monopoly provider of third-
party information would choose to serve only one side of the market rather
than both sides. In our framework, the monopolist always makes (weakly)
more profit from serving both sides of the market. Instead, our objective
is to assess the conditions under which the monopolist would choose to sell
guidebooks over selling accreditations, and vice versa.
Figure 8 shows the parameter regions that cause the monopolist to choose
one or the other of these business models, for values of θ and Φ between 0 and
1.3 These results indicate that selling guidebooks generates more revenue
than selling accreditations if the buyer-seller ratio is relatively low, or if the
bad quality level is relatively low compared to good quality.
3For Φ > 1 the numerical results indicate that the monopolist always chooses to sell
accreditations.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed a market with heterogenous sellers in which the
buyers wish to find high quality sellers but also wish to economize on search
costs. We showed that a third party can facilitate these goals by accrediting
high quality sellers and then providing this information to buyers. All this
was done using a competing auction model. The model gives four main
results: First, the value of information is influenced by a network eﬀect -
the incentive to gain accreditation increases with the number of accredited
sellers; Second, the network eﬀect can dominate other factors and thus a
third party may have an incentive to market guidebooks for free and extract
all revenues from seller accreditation; Third, the third party may have an
incentive to overinvest in information compared to the social planner; And
fourth, selling guidebooks generates more revenue than selling accreditations
if the buyer-seller ratio is relatively low, or if the bad quality level is relatively
low compared to good quality.
There is no obvious market-based solution to the problem of excessive
informational investment by a monopoly third party in our model. In partic-
ular, the information gathering technology is treated as a lumpy investment.
Therefore, if two intermediaries invest in these technologies, redundant in-
vestments are undertaken and hence an ineﬃciency. Alternatively, we might
allow competition prior to the investment in the information gathering tech-
nology. For example, the intermediary might attempt to contract with the
sellers prior to its investment. Here, an intermediary might promise a low
price of accreditation prior to its investment. However, given that the re-
sulting information partition is private information to the intermediary, this
contract would be subject to renegotiation. In particular, a court could not
verify the threat to have any particular accreditation withheld. Therefore,
the intermediary could ask for a price of accreditation that is higher than
the contracted price and the contracted seller would be willing to accept it.
For these reasons, if we take the assumptions of our model seriously, we are
not surprised that accreditation activities are highly regulated.
In terms of the two-sided markets literature, in our model we have shown
that it can be profit-maximizing for a two-sided platform to charge a zero
price on one side of the market, even though there is potentially value on
both sides of the market. Thus a zero price on one side of a two-sided market
does not make it a one-sided market.
The framework developed in this paper may be useful for several avenues
of future research. First, it would be interesting to examine competition
among third-party information services. General issues related to pricing in
two-sided markets are examined by Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Caillaud
and Jullien (2003), among others, but these models assume an exogenous
matching technology for the two sides of the market. In our model, the
demands arise from the equilibrium search behavior of buyers. It would
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also be interesting to examine investment in diﬀerent qualities of assessment
technology by competing firms.
Some additional insights may also be gained by making the trading en-
vironment of our model richer. For example, by introducing entry and exit
by sellers, and/or sale of long-lived assets.
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